'It certainly ought not to excite the least surprise that strong naval Powers should be willing to forego the practice， comparatively useless to them， of employing privateers， upon condition that weaker Powers agree to part with their most effective means of defending their maritime rights. It is in the opinion of this Government to be seriously apprehended that if the use of privateers be abandoned， the dominion over the seas will be surrendered to those Powers which adopt the policy and have the means of keeping up large navies. The one which has a decided naval superiority would be potentially the mistress of the ocean， and by the abolition of privateering that domination would be more firmly secured. Such a Power engaged in a war with a nation inferior in naval strength would have nothing to do for the security and protection of its commerce but to look after the ships of the regular navy of its enemy. These might be held in check by one-half or less of its naval force， and the other might sweep the commerce of its enemy from the ocean. Nor would the injurious erect of a vast naval superiority to weaker states be much diminished if that superiority were shared canons three or four great Powers. It is unquestionably the interest of such weaker states to discountenance and resist a measure which fosters the growth of regular naval establishments.'

　　It is at the same time to be remarked that this opinion， though intelligible， had not always prevailed， and that early in their history the United States had negotiated， through Benjamin Franklin， a treaty with Prussia in 1785 by which it was stipulated that in the event of war neither Power should commission privateers. On the other hand， an early president of the American Union， Monroe， had laid down that it was unworthy of civilised states to prey upon private property when in transit at sea. The result of the refusal of the United States to assent to the Declaration of 1854 was that this Declaration has not become part of the general law of other civilisations， for the assent of a state which is perhaps destined to be the most powerful in the world， and certainly the most powerful neutral state in the world， has been withheld from it. But the United States Government expressed its willingness to join in a modified form of the Declaration， if all private property at sea should be exempted from capture， as President Monroe had argued that it ought to be； and there is good reason to believe that if the signatories of the Declaration would agree to this exemption of private property， the United States would withdraw their objection to the abolition of privateering.

　　The first article of the Declaration was invoked in a dispute which arose between the French and Prussian Governments， then at war， during the contest of 1870. The Prussian Government， soon to be merged in that of Germany， proposed to raise a volunteer navy. All German seafaring men were to over themselves for service in a Federal navy for the whole period of the then proceeding war. The French Government objected to this as a breach of the first article of the Declaration. They declared that it was a species of revival of privateering. Some writers， including Mons. Calvo， and to a certain extent Mr. Hall， have supported these views； but some conditions of the service proposed to be established， as for example the necessity for the volunteers wearing a uniform， the incorporation of the new force with the existing navy， and an oath to articles of war， seem to me to take these naval volunteers out of the class of privateers. As a matter of fact， the Decree was never practically acted upon.

　　It will be seen from the text of the Declaration of Paris， which is set forth above， that its rules do not apply in two cases： first， where contraband of war is carried in a ship； and next， in the case of a ship endeavouring to obtain entrance to a blockaded town. Therefore the law of contraband of war and the law of blockade are not touched by the reform under the Declaration of Paris， except so far as a principle long contended for is applied to blockades.

　　From the very beginning of International Law a belligerent has been allowed to prevent a neutral from supplying his enemy with things capable of being used immediately in war. Such things are called technically 'Contraband of War，' and may be condemned independently of all question as to the neutrality of the owner. The ship and cargo are taken into a port of the captor； the contraband is condemned in a prize court， but the fate of the ship itself varies. If the ship belongs to the owner of the contraband， or if the owner of the ship is privy to the carriage of the contraband， the ship is condemned； but not so if the ship belongs to a different owner， who knows nothing of the destination of the contraband commodities. This branch of International Law is complex and difficult， but it owes its intricacy and difficulty to one special question： what are the articles stigmatised as contraband？ From the very first， Grotius had laid down that things directly used in war —— for example， weapons —— were contraband. He also ruled that things useless in war， articles of luxury as he described them， were not contraband. But outside these categories there were a great number of things capable of employment both in war and peace —— res ancipitis usus —— and it is in regard to these that innumerable questions have arisen. Are articles of naval construction —— for example， the raw materials of sails and cordage —— contraband？ Do they become so at any particular stage of manufacture？ Are iron， brass， steel， etc. contraband？ Are coals and horses？ Are provisions contraband？ To these questions all sorts of answers have been given. In many special treaties the list of contraband and non-contraband commodities is given， and the practice of states is extremely various. On the whole the most general rule which can be laid down is that， with the exception of weapons or munitions of war， the contraband， or non-contraband， character of the cargo must depend on its destination， and on the nature of the particular war which is going on. The commodity most recently sought to be brought into the list as contraband is coal. England， the great exporter of coal， refused to admit its being necessarily contraband； but in the war of 1870 the English Government declined to allow British coal to be carried to a French fleet that was lying in the North Sea. The most vehement of the disputes has been， perhaps， that about provisions. At the end of the last century， when the great war of the Revolution had beam， English statesmen believed the French population to be on the point of starvation； and that the French were suffering great distress from scarcity of food is now most fully established. The English Government therefore seized all ships bound to a French port which were laden with provisions. As their enemy was believed by them to be on the point of abandoning the contest through want of provisions， they refused to allow the stock of provisions to be increased. Just at the same moment the United States had become the great neutral Power enjoying the advantages of the carrying trade， and the Government of the United States issued a series of vehement protests against the assumption of the contraband character of provisions in any circumstances. It is probable that in future provisions will only be contraband when destined for a port in which an enemy's fleet is lying. The point on which I desire to fix your attention is that the test of articles which are contraband of war is not yet settled.

　　The other portion of the older law which is not affected by the Declaration of Paris is Blockade. Blockade is defined as the interruption by a belligerent of access to a place， or to territory， which is in possession of an enemy. Blockade is probably confined to maritime hostilities； but it has considerable external resemblance to a siege by land， and the law of the one acting by land has visibly affected the law of the other acting by sea. But as a matter of fact the objects of blockade and siege are not the same. The aim of a siege is the capture of a strong place or town beset. The aim of a blockade is to put stress on the population of a port， or on the population behind it， through denying it communication， commercial or otherwise， with the rest of the world accessible to it only by sea. This it effects by the rules of International Law， which permit blockading ships to capture ships of the other belligerent which attempt to enter the blockaded port， or to come out of it， or which may reasonably be suspected of having this intention.

　　There are two main conditions of the capture of neutral vessels by a blockading squadron. One is that they must be warned of the existence of the blockade. The mode of giving this notice required by law varies in different countries. France and certain other countries give notice to each ship individually， their cruisers stopping it， and seeing that the stoppage is notified on the ship's papers. England and the United States make public notice in their own territory， and communicate the fact of the blockade to foreign Powers. Under modern circumstances， where information is conveyed over the civilised world by newspapers and the electric telegraph， it certainly seems that the English and American practice is sufficient. It is hardly possible that there should be ignorance nowadays of the existence of an established blockade.

　　The second condition is that mentioned in the Declaration of Paris： the blockade must be effective； that is， it must be maintained by a naval force strong enough to prevent access to the blockaded coast. It is the act of secretly evading a force on the whole adequate which constitutes the offense that subjects a neutral ship to capture —— what is called 'running the blockade.' The stress laid on the sufficiency of the blockade is a legacy from the last century. Hardly any country has not been at some time or other accused of establishing what is called a 'paper blockade；' that is to say， publicly announcing the blockade of a particular portion of the coast， but not supporting it by a sufficient force of ships. It is justly thought that such a blockade gives the maximum of annoyance to honest neutrals， but allows a maximum number of dishonest neutral adventurers to penetrate the line. Nothing can justify the absolute interdiction of a portion of the coast to neutral commerce except a method likely on the whole to secure that end. A blockade must as a general rule be continuously maintained， but an exception is allowed in the case of ships driven away by storm and stress of weather

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